THE BLACK BOX
On the Leverage of Academic Workers
The Editors
2 December 2025

Editor’s Note: This dossier gathers insights, gained through the experience of struggle in US universities, into the leverage that academic workers can effectively wield within our workplaces. The conclusions we have identified are necessarily preliminary and partial. Additional struggles will illuminate new lessons. Moreover, our employers are learning from and adapting to these struggles as well, further emphasizing the need to continuously reflect upon and decipher the lessons of new struggles. We invite readers to contribute to the development of our collective understanding by writing to us with concrete examples, revisions, case studies, questions, and disagreements at highered@longhaulmag.com.
The “long-haul” orientation to higher ed organizing has developed across the past six years through a series of indefinite and protracted strikes by academic workers. This orientation holds that university workers have material leverage in withholding labor – not merely in picketing, rallying, or other symbolic actions – but that it takes time for the pressure of withheld labor to accumulate on the employer. In this, academic workers are unlike their counterparts in ports or factories or schools, where a work stoppage has more immediate and visible effects. One-hundred percent participation in a one or two-day strike would do very little to disrupt the flexible work processes of academic labor. Instead, while a critical mass of workers is of course necessary to take strike action, and while higher participation always has more impact, it is carrying out the strike over time that brings pain to this type of employer.
The labor movement in higher ed contains other orientations to strike action than our own. These are usually adopted from other sectors, and often from the texts of Jane McAlevey, rather than developed out of the experience and study of struggle within our sector. These other approaches often emphasize supermajority strike threats and the importance of support from external “stakeholders” such as lawmakers, the media, and “the community.” All of us have met union staffers or officers who encourage the assumption that strikes by academic workers – especially grads and researchers – have little to no leverage, and therefore preparation ought to revolve around amassing the largest show of force (in raw numbers) and staging “clever” actions, stunts, and demonstrations.
The notion that workers have leverage, and can exert it by going on strike, is simple enough: if a workplace requires labor to function, then the withdrawal of labor will cause problems for the employer. Furthermore, when workers do not deliver the end products of their labor (grades, results, etc), it causes crises later in the chain of transactions, administration, or scientific production. However, the specifics of this process are potentially very complex, and often discoverable only through practice. Sometimes the workplace can feel like a “black box” – a system with observable inputs and outputs, but mysterious inner workings. This is certainly the case in a large university, with its distributed and often unsynchronized and disconnected work processes, stratified workforce, and absence of outwardly visible signs of “production.” Workers themselves are best positioned to grasp these inner workings.
Collectively reasoning about leverage – demystifying the “black box” – is essential to maintaining an indefinite higher ed strike. It helps us refine strike strategy ahead of and during the struggles to come, both maximizing the pain we can cause the boss and circumventing administrative tactics. Perhaps most importantly, it gives workers confidence that their action is hurting the boss: we have found that nothing is more destabilizing in a long struggle, not even the many and varied forms of retaliation, than the sense that the strike is not landing a blow on the administration. We also seek, with this dossier, to counter the tendency towards pessimism and even despair among unionists and union staffers in the sector about our apparent lack of power in the workplace. Counterintuitively, such attitudes seem to have entrenched themselves through the same years that workers have taken increasingly audacious action and with results to celebrate.
In this dossier we collect some insights that academic workers have gained in recent years about how work stoppages pressure the employer. These come from experiences in R1 universities in the United States, although comrades elsewhere have reached similar conclusions. In recent times, the strikes of graduate instructors have taken things furthest, with postdocs and graduate researchers next, followed by adjunct academics.
We do not aim, in this dossier, to address the question of how to organize indefinite university strikes; this has been approached elsewhere in the context of specific strikes (see the appendix of writing on strikes below). We instead intend to share a sober assessment of the impacts of the strikes we have waged, to pose questions about the limitations of what we have learned, and to point in possible but untried directions. Apart from our own experience, we draw evidence from what administrators themselves have revealed during injunction proceedings against strike action, although these claims must be approached with some skepticism. We will refer repeatedly to documents from the University of California’s requests for injunction against strikers in 2024 (first filing, second filing, supplement to second filing, filing in Orange County). Another example of interest is the University of Michigan’s failed injunction request in 2023.
Striking Instruction Labor
The most common university strikes in the United States have been those by academic instructors: graduate student instructors, tenure-track faculty, contingent faculty (lecturers), etc. The labor of these workers includes teaching students, answering emails, grading assignments, holding office hours, determining final grades, and more. We often divide the work of instructors into “instruction” and “grading,” which is a useful distinction despite masking an intimate connection: classroom instruction makes grading labor possible, which makes the submission of grades to the registrar possible, which makes enrollment of students in the next term possible. Each link in the chain may be weakened in the course of an instructional strike. For instance, in a “grade strike,” workers may refuse to share with administrators their final marks for students and/or the results of prior grading assignments, as in the UC Santa Cruz wildcat of 2019. They may also strike (a portion of) the teaching and grading labor during the semester that make final marks possible to assign, as in the University of California (UC) strike of 2022, the University of Michigan (UM) strike of 2023, and several other examples.
We list some tentative conclusions about the leverage entailed by instructional striking:
Classroom Instruction
Struck instruction, in and of itself, is often beyond the ability or interest of administrators to track.
It seems quite clear that administrators tend to have only a very faint sense of what happens in the classroom, and which classes continue to run during the course of a strike. The inability of administrators to keep track of or measure struck instruction has come out in injunction hearings, when administrators argue that unlawful strikes are causing irreparable harm. In 2023, court attendees agreed that the University of Michigan’s witnesses had no reasonable method to estimate the number of struck classes. Strikes at UC, Columbia, UM, Boston University (BU), and elsewhere have seen administrators use blanket attestation forms as their primary method – at least prior to grading deadlines – of determining who is on strike. During the UCSC wildcat strike, administrators admitted their inability to determine who was striking instruction, especially following the failure of a “tattle-bot” sent to undergraduate students, urging them to report their striking teaching assistants. Instead, only grade withholding was punished systematically.
Moreover, administrators rarely make major moves to end an instructional strike – by use of either carrot or stick – during the middle of a semester, when classroom instruction is the primary activity. The UC fired wildcat strikers at UC Santa Cruz in winter 2020 for grade withholding from the previous quarter, not for the next term’s instructional strike. Other lengthy strikes – for instance at Columbia in 2021-2022, the University of California in 2022, University of Michigan in 2023, and Dartmouth College in 2024 – witnessed either major threats or concessions (or both) from the employer around the period of grading deadlines or in the leadup to a new semester.
Instructors of record carry heightened leverage.
Instructors of record are those workers who are tasked with a far greater level of teaching autonomy (control over syllabi, grading format, etc.) than teaching assistants, and who deliver the substance of a course more or less independently. They also tend to be responsible for submitting final grades for students. Typically, a small minority of courses are taught by graduate student instructors of record, and such courses are often concentrated in languages and writing pedagogy.
For obvious reasons, it is very difficult to find qualified replacements for instructors who write their own syllabi and apply their own grading rubrics. (Teaching assistants, by comparison, rarely have their sections scabbed during a strike, but courses will often continue without them and various arrangements are attempted to replace their grading labor). Extracting grades from striking instructors of record is also an additional challenge for administrators. For instance in 2023, some department chairs at the University of Michigan stepped in to assign students blanket “A” grades. At Columbia, the administration struggled to produce final grades for students of striking instructors of record in Fall 2021, in some cases assigning a temporary grade of “credit pending.” Resolving this situation required some makeup work on the part of both students and instructors (whose strike ended before the start of the spring semester, and some of whom did makeup work for backpay).
Administrators are clearly recognizing the significance of instructors of record and are making moves to reduce their autonomy and number. Post-strike, the University of Michigan mandated that graduate students may not be formally designated as instructors of record (each is assigned a “faculty lead”). Columbia has recently made moves to eliminate graduate instructors of record and replace them with scabs from other universities, in anticipation of a potential strike by Student Workers of Columbia (SWC).
The cancellation of classes through striking can also force unexpected consequences for the university. In one example, students sued the University of California, Santa Cruz, in a class action lawsuit for continuing to charge tuition while classes were heavily disrupted. The University came to fear the potential of another lawsuit of this type during a strike in 2024:
Attorney Timothy Yeung: “After a prior UAW wildcat strike at UC Santa Cruz, students filed a class action lawsuit seeking reimbursement [for] canceled classes. The University has settled the matter, but UAW’s conduct raises the risk of further action in light of the newly canceled classes.” UC second injunction filing (2024), p. 2.
Outcomes like this are hard to anticipate, but the point is that prolonged labor withholding can expose the university to vulnerabilities that would have been impossible in a short strike. We want to emphasize that punishing the university legally in this situation was only possible because of the protracted withholding of labor. Our experiences show that administrators commit plenty of flagrant violations that expose them to ULPs and other lawsuits, which does carry some leverage. However, trying to handle class conflict through legal means cannot substitute for workplace organization and labor action.
This isn’t to say that all instructional leverage rests with instructors of record and that teaching assistants have none. With increasing class sizes, much of the actual learning happens in discussion sections led by TAs, and this cannot be made up easily through scab labor:
UC San Diego Executive Vice Chancellor (EVC) Elizabeth Simmons: “[In UCSD’s School of Biological Sciences] … approximately 100 UAW members work in approximately 52 lectures and 19 labs during the spring quarter. Many of the lecture courses are prerequisites for downstream classes, and disrupting the course would affect students’ time to degree and students’ finances (incurring more tuition costs due to a longer degree timeline). The labs—which are graduation requirements—could not continue without UAW members. UAW members are responsible for, among other things, safety, grading and instruction, and without their management, the labs would be cancelled. Finding substitute instructors would also not be possible for the reasons already stated in prior paragraphs.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 12.
The points above illustrate that although the university administration has, of its own volition, debased the quality of education over the decades of neoliberal restructuring, and plans to continue to do so, there is still some educational foundation that the edifice of higher education is built upon. Without this foundation the financial engine of the university loses its pretext, and risks its most important resource: student tuition.
Grades
Striking grades is neither a “silver bullet” that will bring a university to its knees, nor a futile exercise incapable of exercising significant power.
Instead, grades are a terrain of struggle, in which the impact on the administration is a live question open to the intervention of organized workers. Strikers at UC, Columbia, UM, BU and elsewhere have observed that striking throughout grading periods played a significant role in shifting the balance of workplace power enough to win unprecedented contract gains – even when administrators did manage in some fashion to “get the grades in.” At the same time, universities have shown that with the vast array of resources available to them, they are capable of continuing the delivery of grades in spite of an instructional strike. Strikers may be able to create serious headaches for administrators even when they are able to get grades in, forcing them into a position that they would prefer to avoid.
The severity in responses from administrators and the timing of concessions signal that missing grades do provide leverage. At UC Santa Cruz, for example, in December 2019, workers withheld finals grades with the demand for a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). The university, in a carrot and stick fashion, announced in January a means-tested $2,500 housing stipend for the following years, and a five-year funding guarantee for all PhD students, alongside threats of discipline if grades remained missing. When this escalated into a full teaching strike, workers on strike were given the deadline of February 21st (nicknamed “Doomsday” by strikers) to resume work or face termination – with grades, not classroom teaching, being the measurement. Notably, when 85 strikers continued to withhold grades past the Doomsday deadline, the Executive Vice Chancellor called an emergency meeting with yet a new carrot. The University made the $2500 housing stipend universal, rather than means-tested, and applied it retroactively for all PhD and MFA students (the equivalent of an 11 percent raise midcontract). Workers were threatened with firing if they did not submit the missing grades. The most significant concessions in the 2022 UC-wide strike, moreover, came during end-of-term grading deadlines.
Administrators have so far been unable to live with the permanent absence of final grades.
In each grade strike example we are aware of, administrators have applied various means of pressure to get strikers to submit grades, and failing that have turned to other less desirable methods to produce student grades.
It can be difficult to identify the exact ways that missing grades hurt the university economically and administratively. However, we have some basic propositions:
- Missing grades have implications for access to financial aid, given that universities often pay for financial aid and are then reimbursed with state funds. Grades serve as a record of student attendance necessary to receive aid.
UC San Diego EVC Simmons: “Delays in grades may also affect student financial aid. Assessment of Satisfactory Academic Progress is a prerequisite for awarding aid to students. Missing grades will make it impossible to assess which students have made Satisfactory Academic Progress (“SAP”) because we will not have a full picture of the student’s grades. This will be particularly detrimental to students relying on financial aid for fall quarter. UCSD packages aid for the upcoming academic year in mid-July. The University must assess every student’s SAP standing to determine if they are eligible to receive funding in the upcoming academic year. In a typical year, we have over 900 students that are ineligible and require an SAP appeal. Even a short delay in grades would impact these students’ ability to complete their appeals and delay financial aid decisions.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 14.
UC Santa Cruz EVC Lori Kletzer: “In past strikes, delays in obtaining grades led to delays in financial aid disbursements…” UC first injunction filing (2024), p. 173.
- Missing grades also put a wrench in enrollment and registration processes. Students typically require final grades in order to apply for internal or external transfers, in order to enroll in summer courses, etc.
UC San Diego EVC Simmons: “As noted above, when exams and final projects are canceled, students’ final grades will not reflect their actual progress in a course. This could be particularly damaging for students who may have struggled at the beginning of a course, but worked very hard to master course content as the course progressed. These students will be left with failing grades, when they deserve better. Poor grades can impact everything from a student’s ability to progress in their major, to graduate school and employment prospects.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 13-14.
UC Santa Cruz EVC Kletzer: “The potential removal of materials and/or grades from Canvas will also cause considerable delay in issuing grades for students in affected classes. At UC Santa Cruz, undergraduates will automatically receive a Pass (‘P’) grade 30 days after the grading deadline if a grade is not otherwise entered by the instructor of record. This grade may have no relation to the student’s progress in the course and will not contribute to the student’s GPA. UC Santa Cruz requires a 2.0 GPA to graduate. Students who receive a ‘P’ grade instead of a higher letter grade, if they are already close to this threshold, may not satisfy this requirement….
“During the last strike in 2022-23, a single division at UC Santa Cruz (the Arts Division) saw nearly 78% of its classes taught by UAW members go ungraded for months after the close of the quarter.” UC first injunction filing (2024), p. 172-173.
Temporary delays to the reporting of grades are much more manageable for administrators to handle, at least when they feel confident about the length of the delay. In the 2023 UM strike, a group of faculty announced they would withhold grades until May 10, about two weeks past the usual deadline; administrators simply waited and then ramped up the pressure to submit after that point. This point is another illustration of the significance of indefinite strike action in higher ed.
Conventional scabbing – replacing struck instructional labor in a 1:1 fashion – is typically not a sufficient strategy for administrators to produce grades. As a result, if they cannot pressure strikers to submit grades then they will turn to moves that cheapen the “quality” of grades.
Even in “minority” strikes, it has been generally infeasible for administrators to find enough qualified scabs – i.e., instructional workers (internal or external to the given campus) to replace striking workers in the classroom and complete all their grading work.
UC San Diego EVC Simmons: “The sheer number of academic student employees, volume of courses that they teach, and their specialized skills make finding substitute instructors impossible. UCSD has more than 300 classes with enrollment in excess of 100 students. Each of these classes involve crucial support from UAW members.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 10.
However, as bosses often do, university administrators cheapen the value of the product (in this case, instruction and grade assignment) so far as they can get away with it. This can look like:
- Hiring unqualified scabs;
- Instructing faculty to remove assignments from the syllabus when there is not enough labor available to grade them;
- “Simplifying” exams and assignments, for instance by turning long-answer exams into multiple-choice exams;
- Telling faculty to submit blanket “A” grades for some assignments, or even for the whole semester.
In graduate worker strikes, administrators have unfortunately often been able to enlist faculty to help them produce grades and weaken strikes. This has happened via a combination of faculty replacing strikers’ labor and agreeing to produce cheapened grades by significantly altering course syllabi, meanwhile lending the imprimatur of academic authority to what are “bullshit” grades.
When administrators devalue grades, they have an interest in maintaining as many criteria for grade “legitimacy” as possible.
For instance, administrators have shown that they seek:
- Incorporation of as much genuine labor as much as possible. Typically a strike begins mid-way through a semester, meaning that some fraction of the course syllabus has already been covered and there are some graded assignments available to faculty and/or deans. Tracking instructors’ graded work may be non-uniform, and in some cases – particularly for graduate instructors of record (who control their own syllabi) – administrators may have serious difficulty accessing pre-strike grades, forcing them to turn to more desperate methods of grade assignment.
- For instance at the University of Michigan in 2023, the administration made moves during (and after) the strike to increase surveillance of instructors’ work, but graduate instructors in English and other language classes successfully withheld all grade information and left departments with no basis to assign anything other than blanket “A”s. In preparation for fall, and as an ongoing practice at UM post-strike, many departments assigned faculty “secondary instructors” to GSI instructors of record – one of whose functions is to monitor grades on an ongoing basis.
- The sign-off of relevant instructional workers: Roughly, the closer the people entering grades are to the classroom, the better and less potentially embarrassing for administrators (as confirmed by their attempts to pressure direct instructors firstly and most strongly). For instance in a graduate worker strike, a graduate instructor’s submission of grades is better than a faculty lead instructor, who is better than a department chair, who is better than an administrator or staff member, and so on. Collective refusal by faculty to provide a “sign-off” is a critical dimension in the leverage of grade withholding.
- In the UC strikes of 2022 and 2024, organized faculty asked their colleagues to withhold striking workers’ grades with some success. In the University of Oregon finals strike of 2014, unionized faculty opposed the administration’s desperate “academic continuity” plans (including telling faculty to submit grades based on incomplete work). In other past examples, such as the 2019 UC Santa Cruz wildcat and the Yale grade strike of 1995, administrators simply opted for repressive measures against strikers to collect their grades and, in the latter case, enlisted faculty to help do so. But at UM in 2023 and BU in 2024, faculty organization was minimal and faculty largely followed administrators’ orders to submit low-quality grades.
- Acceptance by outside bodies such as accrediting agencies: While accreditation concerns have the potential to constrain administrators, we cannot claim to have gained major insights into how accreditation bodies operate, nor do we have any reason to take confidence in their integrity.
- In the 2021-2022 strike sequence at Columbia, accreditation concerns may have played a role in some students not receiving credit until the strike settlement and subsequent make-up work process. In the 2023 UM strike, strikers submitted an accreditation complaint after students were assigned automatic “A”s in many classes – which likely contributed further pressure on the administration in the context of the strike, even as the formal process ended in UM’s exoneration.
Striking Research Labor
Academic research strikes have been waged by graduate researchers and postdoctoral researchers at Dartmouth, University of California, Mount Sinai, University of Washington, and elsewhere. Overall, the effects of these work stoppages are more diffuse and have a less synchronized impact upon administrators.
Research labor is generally specialized and irreplaceable – in many cases it is essentially impossible to produce scabs.
Individual workers often perform highly specialized technical work with little room for error and sometimes even PIs would have to put in significant time to learn how to pick up the struck research labor.
UC Santa Cruz EVC Kletzer: “Regardless, UAW researchers—whether a PI [Principal Investigator] or not—have specific research expertise making it nearly impossible for anyone else to fill in for them.” UC first injunction filing (2024), p. 174.
UC San Diego EVC Simmons: “Lack of GSR [Graduate Student Researcher] support will delay important projects, impacting research progress, UCSD’s financial outlook, and potential [sic] endanger future sources of funding.”
“The University’s School of Biological Sciences provides a good example. The approximately 100 labs rely on 185 UAW members with specific and extensive training to conduct time sensitive research in their role as Graduate Student Researchers. In invertebrate genetics, with generation times of days, experiments involve multi-generation breeding schemes that cannot be paused. Some labs use complex behavioral training paradigms that require regular training and testing over months or the animal will not be comparable to other specimens. Experiments in developmental biology are very time sensitive as they require precisely timed collection of developmental stages. Due to their specialized training, the UAW members in these labs cannot be replaced. If they walk off the jobs, their work would be lost. Such losses not only result in delays, they also have economic consequences. Labs must restart the experiments, using labor and materials that otherwise could be put towards other purposes. This could cost the University millions of dollars in lost resources.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 14-15.
When graduate researchers and/or postdoctoral researchers strike, the impact is first and foremost on their lab’s principal investigator – and a challenge for strikers is how to direct the pressure they feel upwards to admin.
Principal investigators have much to lose from disruption in their labs, compared with administrators:
UC Berkeley EVC Benjamin Hermalin: “Lack of GSR support will vastly slow research on the campus. This risks Principal Investigators being unable to complete projects in a timely fashion. Because many grants are provided for a fixed period of time, these delays risk Principal Investigators running out of grant funding to complete projects and/or being able to meet expectations with regards to deliverables. Delays in completing projects put at risk Principal Investigators’ ability to compete successfully for subsequent grant funding (funding, ironically, necessary to employ GSRs). Serious delays in completing projects would affect Principal Investigators’ academic careers, in particular causing delays in their merit and promotion reviews, including tenure reviews. In a worst-case scenario, the delays could result in negative tenure reviews.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 8
Organizers at Dartmouth observed that PIs were a “disorganized middle strata” who were desperate for the fastest resolution to the strike, regardless of the terms, and who would apply pressure either upwards to administrators or downwards to strikers depending on which side seemed weaker. If their first instinct was to break the strike in their lab, the resolve of strikers over time caused a sense of panic among PIs, which they directed towards administration as well.
The impact of a research strike accumulates slowly and highly unevenly across workers and labs, and there are no synchronous moments of leverage.
While instructional workers generally perform work scheduled around the academic calendar at roughly uniform times, research strikers have found that the timescales for research work are much longer and more varied. Major experiments and grant deadlines might take place at any time of year, and any one worker in a lab might be critical to an experiment in one month but not another.
After the UC strike of 2022, organizers at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography at UC San Diego polled their coworkers and determined:
Strike power is unevenly distributed based on details of the research process, often placing a select few workers in strategic positions for labor disruption. This is reflected in the data: graduate workers self-reported being essential workers in their labs, but major experiments in a given lab (e.g. field campaigns, research cruises, etc.) happen only a few times a year at SIO. In some cases, a few key grad workers are responsible for critical deliverables (e.g. data, tools, reports, forecasts, etc), or one worker operates an instrument that’s critical for many others.
In the Dartmouth strike of 2024, organizers reached similar conclusions. Moreover, the university slowly granted contract concessions over the course of their months-long research strike, a pattern quite different from strikes with large numbers of instructional workers, where significant concessions have often come “all at once” in a package deal typically around the period of final exams or the leadup to a new semester.
Striking industrial research carries more leverage than striking basic research.
Participants in recent research strikes have found that faculty in “applied” labs – those that produce products with direct medicinal, military, commodity, or other use – have retaliated more heavily against striking research workers than in those labs that do basic research.
This is likely due to the fact that applied labs bring in significantly more grant money than other labs. While this can be best understood at the departmental and campus level, the 2023 Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) survey reveals (Table 2) that the federal agencies with highest Research & Development (R&D) expenditures were Health and Human Services (HHS), in the lead by far, followed by the Department of Defense (DOD). The same survey results show (Table 3) that the life sciences and engineering together received over 70 percent of all higher education R&D expenditures in the United States.
Research strikes can threaten universities’ income through grants, intellectual property and patents.
As they sought an injunction against the 2024 Palestine strike, various UC administrators testified about the anticipated harm of the strike by researchers, often highlighting the impact on flows of grant money and the disruption of studies. It must be noted that the examples adduced were hypothetical, with the exception of a reference to the Scripps Institution of Oceanography during the 2022 UC strike (read more about the strike in Scripps here). In this context, administrators are served by exaggeration and catastrophization, since they are required to demonstrate “irreparable harm” in order to secure an injunction.
However, the specificity of certain examples suggest that they are filtering up from those members of faculty managing such grants, and administrator testimonies occasionally cite faculty fears (such testimony, given freely under oath, is precisely as trustworthy as any boss’s – not in the slightest!). Even as we do not know of a lab or department that actually lost funding through a strike of researchers at UC, UW, or Dartmouth College, the possibility that it could occur seems to have some basis in reality, and to represent, therefore, potential leverage. Moreover, what is not hypothetical is the huge amount of overhead that universities absorb from external research funding: were grant funding to be imperilled, it would certainly curtail university receipts (various university responses to the federal funding freeze recently demonstrates as much). Here, we reproduce examples of fears expressed by administrators at UC Santa Cruz and UC San Diego:
UC Santa Cruz EVC Kletzer: “Lack of GSR support may result in research delays or loss of research, which impacts the ability of faculty to meet the expectations of grants, potentially imperiling future university funding. The effect of these employees withholding their labor poses a significant threat to the research conducted in the laboratories staffed by these UAW members.
“Climate and Environmental Research: Studies tracking climate variables or environmental pollutants over time, such as water quality monitoring or atmospheric studies. These projects depend on regular data collection at specific intervals. Delays or gaps can invalidate the entire study period. Through our Institute for Marine Sciences, and departments of Ocean Sciences, Earth and Planetary Sciences, Environmental Studies and Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, there are approximately 50 graduate students who carry out field-based experiments for terrestrial and ocean-based data gathering. A specific example includes a 40-year study of elephant seals at Ano Nuevo. The strike imperils this work, and like the other areas of study, risks compromising research results, delaying projects, and harming the University’s ability to get grant funding.
“Cell Culture Experiments: Experiments involving the growth and maintenance of cell lines, such as cancer cells or stem cells require regular cell cultures, daily monitoring, feeding, and maintenance. Any disruption can lead to cell death or contamination, setting back research progress significantly. Examples of the strike’s impact on these studies include the following. A large number of studies in microbiology, molecular biology, biochemistry, biomedical engineering at UC Santa Cruz have experiments that require continued maintenance and continued experimentation on cell lines. This is particularly true for studies involving stem cells and other primary cell lines from humans and other mammals that require daily care. This work is primarily done by approximately 70 UAW members, including GSRs and postdoctoral scholars. A strike will endanger this work as well.” UC first injunction filing (2024), p. 173-175.
UC San Diego EVC Simmons: “Lack of GSR support will delay important projects, impacting research progress, UCSD’s financial outlook, and potential [sic] endanger future sources of funding.
“Delays in the delivery of results also risk funding sources. Many funders have only 1 to 3 deadlines per year for any given funding scheme. Competitive proposals for these grants require extensive preliminary data. Delays in experiments due to UAW members withholding labor will impact the data UCSD has available to submit to these proposals. For example, faculty in UCSD’s Scripps Institution of Oceanography experienced some of the consequences outlined above during the last UAW strike in 2022 and 2023. Then, samples in the Geochemistry Facility were not processed on time due to UAW members withholding their work. This delayed research results and grant proposal submissions up to a year.
“Faculty at the University’s Shiley Eye Institute provide additional examples of the negative effects a UAW work stoppage will have on research. Some faculty plan to use data from UAW members’ projects in the coming weeks and months for upcoming grant proposals. A strike will delay the completion of these projects by 4-12 months and place the grant funding at risk.
“Other research funding sources would also be endangered. Funding for some NIH-sponsored projects depend on UCSD’s ability to enroll patients in studies. UAW members participate in these enrollments. A UAW strike would affect funding for these awards because fewer patients would be enrolled, and it would affect the lab’s ability to complete the study in the original intended timeline.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 15.
Strike Timing
Academic work follows a seasonal rhythm with discrete points of leverage unevenly distributed across the calendar. University operations can often be rearranged to accommodate short-term disruptions, but certain moments on the calendar contain pressure points which leave administrators with less room to maneuver.
As far as instruction is concerned, these points are concentrated at the beginning and end of academic terms. On the one hand, disrupting the opening weeks of instruction, while add/drop periods remain open and when the essential content of a course is delivered, forces administrators to confront empty classrooms and missed instruction. As was discussed above, the absence of instructors appears to be more tolerable to administrators during the middle of a term. On the other hand, the end of a term is when exams are administered and when final grades must be entered.
It would be mistaken to take either the start or end of a term as a moment of “peak power,” after which all is lost if the employer hasn’t met the demands. It is the continuous accumulation of missed instruction, research, and service which builds pressure at these discrete moments. This remains true from the end of one term on to the start of another – students with missing prerequisite grades cannot pass on to the rest of the course sequence, etc.
With this in mind, it seems most strategic to time strikes to hit as many of these moments as possible, carrying across multiple academic terms. This is more feasible the shorter the break between terms: sustaining a strike through many months of summer is harder than through a few weeks of winter. Many had assumed that striking towards the end of the academic year, with all the ceremony around graduation and other end-of-year activities, would have maximum leverage. However, the timing of concessions in the long strikes at the University of Michigan and Boston University suggest that administrators are perfectly willing and able to let the summer months unfold, during which it is also much harder to maintain coherence among strikers, until fall comes into view.
From what we currently understand, an instructional strike beginning towards the end of a fall term, taking out key instructional weeks, and then threatening the exam and grading period and the beginning of the next term, contains the greatest potential for leverage.
Leverage from research labor is more diffusely distributed in time and best analyzed at the level of department or lab, with an eye towards funding deadlines and the labor process itself. In most universities, there is a blend of research and instructional labor (in this, Dartmouth College is mostly an exception). In such cases, it likely makes more sense to time the strike around the instructional calendar.
Future Directions
While we have demonstrated a growing collective understanding of the leverage of academic strikers, there are still a number of open questions. Developing answers to these questions may be of major significance for future strikes, as success relies on maximizing leverage against employers who are developing their own growing understanding of long-haul academic strikes and how to mitigate their impact.
Cross-unit action
In most instructional and research settings, courses and labs are made up of several job classifications. These admit considerable variation but tend to resemble the following:
- Instruction: an instructor of record (member of faculty, adjunct instructor, or graduate student); teaching assistant(s); and other auxiliary workers like support tutors or “readers” (workers who grade without teaching);
- Research: a Principal Investigator (PI), typically on faculty or a senior academic researcher; postdoctoral fellows; graduate students; technicians and other researchers; and sometimes undergraduate workers.
By “cross-unit action,” we refer to concerted activity by multiple types of instructional or research workers towards the same goal. The terminology derives from the existence of separate bargaining units and union locals for these different job titles, which is the norm, although some universities have wall-to-wall unions (the UK has one giant system). We are referring specifically to action or organizing that is “wall-to-wall from below,” and therefore possible regardless of union definitions. (Indeed, unions like PSC-CUNY that are officially wall-to-wall have not, as a rule, found it any simpler to take militant cross-unit action, with the notable exception of the 2023 strike at Rutgers.) There are many other types of workers upon whom university operations, such as instruction and research, depend – staff, building custodians, resident advisors, etc – but our experiences and inquiry have mainly involved labor actions by the listed categories of academic workers.
In the lengthy strikes by US academic workers of recent years, only one or two layers of the academic workforce have struck: in most cases, graduate instructors, and increasingly graduate and postgraduate researchers. Where strikes by one or two layers of the instructional or research workforce have taken things furthest, their leverage has been significantly blunted (and in many cases, undermined) from workers in other units scabbing. It seems clear that to bring our fullest leverage to bear on the administration, we need to strive towards a strike that is wall-to-wall for the long haul, but this remains an aspiration to this point. It seems clear that the prospect of coordination is a source of fear to administrators:
UC Santa Cruz EVC Kletzer: “Because UAW has described the work stoppage as a ‘strike’ UPS delivery trucks will not cross the ‘picket line’ and enter UC Santa Cruz’s campus. Accordingly, UC Santa Cruz is not receiving deliveries on its campus. Similarly, METRO buses refuse to enter UC Santa Cruz’s residential campus as a result of UAW’s actions. Instead, buses drop riders off near the base of campus and then return to their normal route. Riders must then walk uphill to their homes….
“The UC Santa Cruz Faculty Association, a union of UC Santa Cruz senate faculty, has expressly instructed its members not to assist in covering work done by UAW members engaged in a work stoppage. They have also sent UC Santa Cruz a letter indicating their belief that they are free to engage in a sympathy strike with UAW members. Some faculty have already indicated that they will not submit student grades if their UAW graduate students remain on strike.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 23.
While we generally avoid discussion of organizing in this dossier, we will note that the cross-unit problem is far easier to acknowledge than it is to solve. Effective models of cross-unit organizing and coordination at the level of the shop floor (for instance, in a particular department) are needed. To our knowledge, this has been taken furthest at UC Santa Cruz, where it has been achieved gradually across several strikes and concerted organizing among various unionists.
Summer
Over the summer, universities typically hold a small number of intensive classes, with course material condensed into a shorter period of time than in fall or spring. A relatively larger portion of these courses tend to be taught by graduate students as instructors of record compared to the regular term. Research work also continues over the summer.
The impact of continuing a strike into the summer period is not yet fully understood (though the Boston University 2024 strike is one example of an attempt to strike summer instruction). But there is reason to believe it could pack significant leverage, even as it raises very difficult organizing questions. In their injunction filing against the 2024 strike for Palestine, the UC claimed, more convincingly than usual, that a summer continuation of the strike might have serious repercussions at Berkeley:
UC Berkeley EVC Hermalin: “Over 15,000 students have enrolled in UC Berkeley’s summer session. Although classes for these sessions run on varying schedules, assuming UAW’s strike continues only through June 30, it would impact over 12,000 of the enrolled students… Approximately 136 courses and 161 sections in Session A (6 weeks), Session B (10 weeks) and Session C (8 weeks) have UAW graduate student employees as the primary instructor of record, the de facto instructor of the course, or providing essential support to the instructor of record for a course. If UAW members strike for the month of June (or a significant portion thereof), then these courses would be without instruction and would very likely be canceled because finding substitute instructors in a timely manner will, as a rule, be impossible. This is largely due to the lengthy and involved nature of the UC search process at a point when these courses are well underway or about to begin… Also keep in mind that it would obviously be challenging to recruit graduate students to replace striking student workers and that Senate faculty are almost all on nine-month (academic-year) appointments and, thus, cannot be required to substitute for striking workers in the summer….
“Further, given the short duration and nature of the summer session, the University could not make up these courses after the fact… Cancellations will impact their ability to complete courses they need to graduate, likely preventing them from moving forward in their programs and thus delaying their ability to graduate and begin earning wages. Session C is the largest session and includes not only Berkeley students but also thousands of visiting students. These visiting students make travel and living arrangements to come to our campus, costs that will not be refunded to them. It is also extremely unlikely these students will be able to adjust their study dates or return for another summer. This session also marks the start of our Pre-College Scholars residential program, in which high school students come to live and study on our campus. All of our summer student populations will be deeply affected by course cancellations or alterations at this late date. Attending summer sessions are not required and many students and their families are paying extra to attend. Additionally, not taking summer session courses can preclude students taking one or more courses in the academic year for which they have enrolled, but for which the canceled summer sessions course(s) is (are) a prerequisite; and it can lengthen time to degree because those credits will need to be earned later in the students’ careers and/or because students have had to delay declaring a major.” UC second injunction filing supplement (2024), p. 6-8.
Administrators
When we refer to the university administration as a unified entity, we typically oversimplify – in practice there are many administrators with their own interests, who work together in ways that are often loose and inefficient. An academic strike may impact certain administrators on a personal level in ways that do not reach the “top brass” – for instance by creating extra work and general headaches for the low-level administrators tasked with creating strikebreaking plans, dealing with student grade complaints, etc. Strikes may also open up or exacerbate tensions between different administrative actors. However, we cannot claim to have reached an analysis of which administrators are most heavily impacted by a strike, how they may direct pressure upward, etc. This is similar to the question of how faculty, impacted personally by a graduate student strike (most especially a research strike), might redirect the pressure onto administrators.
Insider strategies
Work-to-rule actions in general involve workers performing the absolute minimum of their required duties, and therefore diminishing the output of their labor (which often goes beyond explicit requirements as a matter of course). Workers pursued this strategy following the multi-week strike for Palestine at UC Santa Cruz in Spring 2024, in a way that was experimental and achieved only partial success – resulting in the continued withholding of a portion of final grades that were set to be withheld had the strike continued (5,000 grades, ultimately). In this case, three-weeks of striking gave workers an opportunity to leverage the contract’s workload protections, saying there was simply too much make-up work to grade everything and turn in grades on time before their teaching appointments ended, after which they could not be made to work.
We do not know the circumstances in which work-to-rule is most impactful on a university administration, but it bears further thought and experimentation.
Appendix: Case Studies
We invite readers to contribute additional case studies to this appendix. Write to us at highered@longhaulmag.com.
University of Michigan Mathematics, 2023 Strike
The UM math department, which heavily relies on graduate students for teaching labor and where striking grads withheld grades longer than in other major departments, is a potentially instructive example to understand the impacts of the 2023 strike. The intro program at UM – precalculus, calculus I, and calculus II – consists of small classes (typically fewer than 20 students) taught by a GSI, lecturer, or postdoc. These classes are overseen by one or two coordinators who are normally lecturers, often assisted by a GSI co-coordinator; coordinators write exams and some assignments on top of various administrative and mentoring duties. Some flexibility is available to instructors in teaching and grading, while most of the syllabus is course-wide and most (typically 75 percent) of students’ grades are determined by three exams, each of which consists largely of highly conceptual questions and is graded by the instructional team synchronously in lengthy (~four–eight hour) sessions. A supermajority of the 80 or so math GSIs were on strike throughout April, most of whom taught in this intro program and whose students were therefore without an instructor of record. About one-third to one-half of students were in these struck sections.
In the early part of the strike, systematic scabbing mostly took the form of certain faculty volunteering additional labor by offering large “review sessions” to these students, which by student accounts were a poor substitute for the classroom. As final exams approached, calculus coordinators cited pressure from department leadership and deans, as well as lack of faith that UM would not force them to overwork to handle the mess of grades post-strike,* as reasons for their decision to significantly deteriorate the final exam and modify the course grading system.** Strikers’ attempts to convince coordinators otherwise, and to reach out to potentially sympathetic faculty to organize a non-scabbing effort or relieve pressure on lecturers, were unsuccessful. In the end math strikers held a picket outside the finals grading sessions, but grading was nonetheless completed.
Determination of calculus grades seemed to pose a greater challenge for UM than the determination of grades in other departments, since: (a) entering all As for calculus, a known weed-out course, would likely lead to serious repercussions (suggesting that such STEM classes may carry special leverage); (b) lecturers coordinating the calculus classes refused to enter grades in place of strikers; (c) in the meantime, the missing calculus grades were creating a minor crisis as students flooded the emails of coordinators, administrators, and former GSIs not knowing what to do when summer courses or internal transfer applications (particularly to the business school) demanded their calculus grade. Ultimately because coordinators had made it possible to assign final exam grades, a dean was able to collude with the math associate chair and a notorious faculty scab to enter grades with a formula unknown to us, but very likely incorporating exam grades.
As fall approached, we learned through course coordinators that deans approached department leadership, requiring them to develop a contingency plan in case of a continued fall strike. By all accounts, everyone in the department was aware that finding enough instructors to replace striking GSIs would be impossible. Instead, math department leadership implemented notable changes to fall intro courses: almost all GSIs were assigned to Calculus I, rather than spread out across courses (so that strikebreaking plans need only be developed for a single course); class sizes were slightly increased, to reduce the number of sections; some course assignments in Calculus I were temporarily eliminated, to reduce grading labor; and GSIs would be required to promptly report the results of quiz/assignment grading during the semester in a centralized database. All of these measures remained in place in fall, despite the settlement of the new contract, and created some messiness in the intro program.
Notes:
* The lecturer union’s staff and elected officers warned rank-and-file lecturers that unless they met grading deadlines, they would be subject to discipline. That these lecturers – far from radicals, and inactive in their union – nonetheless refused to submit grades in place of their GSIs, suggests the strike had a workplace impact that could exceed union officers’ understanding and control. Had this behavior been more widespread among faculty, the strike could have perhaps been settled earlier.
** The exam lengths were shortened, and the questions simplified to reduce partial-credit opportunities, so as to limit the labor needed to grade. One coordinator wrote that “the strike has severely crippled the course — I really dislike giving exams with minimal partial credit.”
Appendix: Writing on Strikes and Leverage at Universities
University of California
Davies, Jack and Sarah Mason. “Short of the Long Haul: An Account of the Largest Strike in US Higher Education (in two parts).” Notes From Below
Part 1 Part 2
On strike preparation and assessment in 2022, view from UCSC
Tenure-Track Faculty Are a Key Piece of the Academic Labor Puzzle.” Jacobin.
Faculty involvement in 2022 strike, the view from UCSC
Gepts, Thomas et al, “Organizing Associational Power: A Strikers’ Inquiry into the 2022 UAW Strike against the University of California.” Forthcoming in Critical Sociology.
Comparison of 2022 strike at UCSC and UC Berkeley
Current and Former Grad Workers at UC Santa Cruz, “From the Camp to the Picket: Reflections from the UC Strike for Palestine.” Long-Haul
Strike in solidarity with Palestine in 2024, view from UCSC
Mason, Sarah. “The Challenge of Organizing Researchers.” Extractive University Project.
On the challenges of undertaking researcher strikes
Davies, Jack and Muriam Haleh Davis. “Building Solidarity with Palestine through Labor Organizing: The UAW Strike at the UC.” APSA MENA.
On cross-unit organizing among grads and faculty in context of strike at UCSC
COLA Agitation Committee. “Recording the Complexity of Struggle.” Viewpoint Magazine
On the practice of agitation during a struggle; most comprehensive record on the 2019 wildcat strike, although it was not yet finished
Ng, Jessica et al. “On Research Strikes: Lessons from Scripps Institution of Oceanography.” Science for the People
Strike leverage assessment in STEM, view from UCSD
University of Michigan
Stark, Alejo et al. “University of Michigan Graduate Workers Are on Strike.” Jacobin
Short piece on the 2020 strike
Mueller, Michael and Lucy Peterson. “Reflections on a Teaching Assistant Strike: Strategic lessons from graduate organisers at the University of Michigan.” Notes From Below
Account of 2023 strike from mid-way through
Brown, Kathleen. “GEO vs. the University of Michigan.” Against the Current
Retrospective account of same strike immediately afterwards
Organizers from the UMich 2023 strike. “Striking to Win in Higher Ed: Lessons from the 2023 Grad Strike at the University of Michigan.” Long-Haul
Longer retrospective account of strike
Boston University
Vilallonga, Lucia and Jacksyn Bakeberg. “Old Formulas, New Playbook: Building a Striking Department at Boston University.” Long-Haul
Granular description of pre-strike department organizing in Math
Yuen, Stacey and Alana Edwards. “On for Young and Old: How Boston University’s Resident Assistants Pulled Off a Double Strike.” Long-Haul
On the two strikes by residential assistants at BU in 2024
Various. Account of longest higher ed strike in US history (forthcoming in Long-Haul)
Columbia University
Lee-Brown, Joanna and Izzy Plowright. “A Tale of Two Strikes: Student Workers of Columbia Struggle against Business Unionism.” Spectre Journal
Comparison of two strikes back to back in 2021–22
Dartmouth College
Freeman, David et al. “Field Work: An Experiment on Striking STEM research at Dartmouth College.” Long-Haul
On strike by all-STEM unit
Temple University
Kosmicki, Bethany and Matt Ford. “Minority Strikes Can Work: An Account from Graduate Workers in Philadelphia.” Notes From Below
On minority strike action at Temple University
University and College Union (United Kingdom)
Dinnen, Zara and James Eastwood. “How to Stop a University: The Case for Indefinite Strike Action.” Notes From Below
Case for indefinite (long-haul) strike action
Mozzachiodi, Roberto and Joe Newman. “Notes on a Marking and Assessment Boycott: Reflections and lessons from marking and assessment boycotts at Goldsmith University.” Notes From Below
On the UCU assessment and marking boycott
The University Worker. “A Rank-and-File Perspective on the Consultative Ballot: Turning the Ballot into an Organising Opportunity.” Notes From Below
On the new consultative ballot, based on rank-and-file initiative
